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NOTE
An Implausible Standard for Affirmative Defenses
Stephen Mayer*
In the wake of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the
federal district courts split over whether to apply Twombly’s plausibility stan-
dard to the pleading of affirmative defenses. Initially, a majority of district
courts extended Twombly to defense pleadings, but recently the courts that
have declined to extend the plausibility standard have gained majority status.
This Note provides a comprehensive analysis of each side of the plausibility
split, identifying several hidden assumptions motivating the district courts’
decisions. Drawing from its analysis of the two opposing positions, this Note
responds to the courts that have applied plausibility pleading to affirmative
defenses by identifying several fundamental flaws in their appeals to tradition,
policy, and the text of Rule 8. Due to misguided reliance on historical pleading
practices, an imprecise reading of Twombly, and an overestimation of the
availability of discovery for unpled or stricken affirmative defenses, these
courts fail to recognize that extending plausibility pleading beyond the com-
plaint imposes an asymmetrical and unfairly onerous burden on defendants.
This Note concludes that the courts that extend Twombly to affirmative de-
fenses do so in violation of both the canons of statutory construction and the
principles of the Rules Enabling Act.
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Introduction
More than one hundred federal cases have contemplated whether the
plausibility standard outlined in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly1 and Ashcroft
v. Iqbal2 applies to affirmative defenses,3 yet the districts remain divided, and
no court of appeals has yet addressed the issue.4 This division stems from
the fact that the Supreme Court’s three most important interpretations of
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure5 have focused exclusively on
Rule 8(a)(2), providing relative clarity in the pleading of complaints but no
explicit guidance with regard to affirmative defenses.
For the fifty years leading up to Twombly, the federal courts relied on
the liberal notice pleading standards outlined in Conley v. Gibson,6 which
held with reference to Rule 8(a)(2) that “all the Rules require is ‘a short and
plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what
1. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
3. Riemer v. Chase Bank USA, 274 F.R.D. 637, 640 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (noting that
over one hundred federal cases have examined the post-Twombly affirmative defense pleading
standard).
4. Godson v. Eltman, Eltman & Cooper, P.C., 285 F.R.D. 255, 257 (W.D.N.Y. 2012)
(“[T]he applicability of Twombly and Iqbal to affirmative defenses [is] a dispute that has been
brewing in the district courts since those cases were decided. No clear answer has yet been
distilled. Indeed, as the parties acknowledge, not one court of appeals has considered this
issue.”).
5. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
6. 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957), abrogated in part on other grounds by Twombly, 550 U.S.
544.
November 2013] Affirmative Defenses 277
the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”7 Conley directed
“that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless
it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in sup-
port of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”8 When the Court rein-
terpreted Conley’s “notice pleading” standard half a century later in
Twombly, it once again focused exclusively on Rule 8(a)(2),9 explaining that
to “sho[w] the pleader is entitled to relief,”10 the plaintiff must plead suffi-
cient factual matter to show a claim is “plausible on its face.”11 Two years
later, when Iqbal made it clear that Twombly’s plausibility standard extends
“to all civil complaints,”12 the Court similarly restricted its holding to an
interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2).13
While Twombly and Iqbal have given rise to a “deluge”14 of academic
commentary addressing the merits of plausibility pleading and the history of
Rule 8 in general,15 this Note addresses these cases solely as they relate to the
pleading standard applicable to affirmative defenses. Conley, Twombly, and
Iqbal do not mention Rule 8(c), which governs affirmative defenses.16 All
three decisions focus on the sufficiency of a complaint, as opposed to an
answer or a defense, and the Court has never explicitly applied Twombly’s
plausibility standard to pleadings beyond the complaint in any other case.17
Despite the lack of direct guidance from the Court on whether to extend
plausibility pleading beyond Rule 8(a)(2), many of the initial district court
7. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47 (footnote omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). This
particular section of Conley was adopted in Twombly, see infra notes 96–101 and accompany-
ing text.
8. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46. The Court explicitly “retire[d]” this “no set of facts”
language as an “incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard,” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 562–63, while highlighting other portions of Conley as a proper guide to interpreting
Rule 8(a)(2), see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
9. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545 (“The need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly
suggesting (not merely consistent with) agreement reflects Rule 8(a)(2)’s threshold require-
ment that the ‘plain statement’ possess enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’ ”).
10. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
11. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
12. Atiyeh v. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, 742 F. Supp. 2d 591, 599 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
13. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667–68 (2009) (“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do
not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2))).
14. Edward H. Cooper, King Arthur Confronts TwIqy Pleading, 90 Or. L. Rev. 955, 956
(2012); see also Kevin M. Clermont, Three Myths About Twombly–Iqbal, 45 Wake Forest L.
Rev. 1337, 1337 (2010) (“[J]udges and lawyers really are speaking of little besides Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal . . . .”).
15. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 Duke L.J. 1 (2010).
16. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
17. Perez v. Gordon & Wong Law Grp., P.C., No. 11-CV-03323-LHK, 2012 WL
1029425, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012) (“[N]either the Supreme Court nor any of the circuit
courts has yet to address this question . . . .”).
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decisions on this issue “found that the heightened pleading standard an-
nounced in Twombly and Iqbal does apply to affirmative defenses.”18 The
rationales outlined by both courts and scholars to justify such an extension
have been exceptionally uniform.19 This Note expands that discussion by
exposing several flawed assumptions underlying courts’ decisions to apply
Twombly to affirmative defenses and by introducing several frequently over-
looked arguments supporting the courts that have confined Twombly to the
pleading of complaints.
Specifically, this Note argues that the Twombly and Iqbal decisions did
not contemplate applying the plausibility standard to affirmative defenses,
and absent additional developments in federal civil procedure, such an ex-
tension imposes an asymmetrical and unfairly onerous burden on defend-
ants. Part I provides a comprehensive analysis of each side of the plausibility
split, identifying several hidden assumptions motivating the district courts’
decisions. Part II responds to the courts that have applied plausibility plead-
ing to affirmative defenses by identifying several fundamental flaws in their
appeals to tradition, policy, and the text of Rule 8. Part III presents two
frequently overlooked affirmative arguments in support of the rapidly grow-
ing number of courts that have declined to extend plausibility pleading be-
yond the complaint.
I. Analyzing Arguments on Either Side of the Plausibility Split
The numerous district court opinions that have addressed whether
plausibility pleading should be extended to affirmative defenses generally
discuss four main issues: (1) whether fairness and historical precedent dic-
tate that courts hold plaintiffs and defendants to the same pleading stan-
dard, (2) whether Twombly applies to Rule 8 as a whole or Rule 8(a)
specifically, (3) whether the policy rationale motivating the Twombly and
18. Ansari v. Elec. Document Processing, Inc., No. 5:12-CV-01245-LHK, 2012 WL
3945482, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2012).
19. Four articles have been written to date advocating for the application of heightened
pleading standards to affirmative defenses. See Melanie A. Goff & Richard A. Bales, A “Plausi-
ble” Defense: Applying Twombly and Iqbal to Affirmative Defenses, 34 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 603
(2011); Joseph A. Seiner, Plausibility Beyond the Complaint, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 987
(2012); James V. Bilek, Comment, Twombly, Iqbal, and Rule 8(c): Assessing the Proper Standard
to Apply to Affirmative Defenses, 15 Chap. L. Rev. 377 (2011); Nathan A. Leber, Note, Solving a
Pleading Plague: Why Federal Courts Should Strike Insufficient Affirmative Defenses Under the
Twombly–Iqbal Plausibility Standard, 61 Clev. St. L. Rev. 231 (2013). Three other articles
find convincing the arguments that the courts declining to apply heightened pleading to af-
firmative defenses advance. See Peter M. Durney & Jonathan P. Michaud, Fending off the Use of
a Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses, 79 Def. Couns. J. 438 (2012); Anthony
Gambol, Note, The Twombly Standard and Affirmative Defenses: What Is Good for the Goose Is
Not Always Good for the Gander, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 2173 (2011); Nathan Pysno, Note,
Should Twombly and Iqbal Apply to Affirmative Defenses?, 64 Vand. L. Rev. 1633 (2011). And
one initial article introduces the district court split over the issue. See Manuel John Domin-
guez et al., The Plausibility Standard as a Double-Edged Sword: The Application of Twombly and
Iqbal to Affirmative Defenses, 84 Fla. B.J. 77 (2010).
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Iqbal decisions necessitates extending plausibility pleading to affirmative de-
fenses, and (4) whether Rule 12(a)’s20 twenty-one-day time limit for filing an
answer unfairly prejudices defendants held to a plausibility standard.21 This
Note critiques several assumptions underlying these arguments in an at-
tempt to reframe the debate over plausibility pleading’s application to af-
firmative defenses. Consequently, an examination of the arguments
themselves is necessary to provide context for Parts II and III. Section I.A
addresses the arguments advanced by those in favor of extending plausibility
pleading to affirmative defenses (the “plausibility courts”), while Section I.B
addresses the arguments advanced by those opposed to such an extension
(the “declining courts”).
A. Arguments for Extending Plausibility Pleading
In the years immediately following Twombly and Iqbal, most of the dis-
trict courts that considered affirmative defense pleading standards extended
plausibility pleading from complaints to defenses, although that position has
recently lost its majority status.22 The district courts that extend plausibility
pleading to affirmative defenses have nearly all advanced three principal ar-
guments in support of their positions: (1) fairness indicates that Twombly’s
plausibility standard, like Conley’s notice standard before it, should apply
symmetrically to complaints and defenses; (2) Twombly reinterpreted notice
pleading generally, equally affecting complaints under Rule 8(a), answers
under Rule 8(b), and affirmative defenses under Rule 8(c); and (3) the pol-
icy concerns underlying the Twombly decision justify applying plausibility
pleading to affirmative defenses.23 This Section analyzes each of these argu-
ments and identifies several key assumptions on which they rest.
1. Basic Fairness and Historical Precedent Necessitate the Application of
Symmetrical Pleading Standards
Of all the arguments raised to justify extending plausibility pleading to
affirmative defenses, the assertion that basic fairness requires courts to apply
the same pleading standard to both plaintiffs and defendants is probably the
most deeply entrenched in district court jurisprudence. Early cases consider-
ing affirmative defense pleading standards post-Twombly24 cited this histori-
cally motivated argument, and the first major scholarly article on the subject
noted its ubiquity.25 The primary thrust of the argument is simple: since
20. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i).
21. See generally Goff & Bales, supra note 19, at 635–36, 638–39, 642 (introducing the
principal district court arguments).
22. See infra Section I.B (summarizing the position of the “declining courts”).
23. Pysno, supra note 19, at 1648.
24. See, e.g., Shinew v. Wszola, No. 08-14256, 2009 WL 1076279, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Apr.
21, 2009) (discussing considerations of “fair play” and quoting Wright & Miller’s assertion
that pleading standards have historically been symmetrical).
25. Dominguez et al., supra note 19, at 78.
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Rule 8’s goal is to ensure fair notice to all litigating parties, it would make no
sense to apply one pleading standard to plaintiffs and another to defend-
ants—“what’s good for the goose is good for the gander.”26 Courts support
this simple proposition in two ways: they argue that (1) plaintiffs and de-
fendants have historically shouldered the same burden under Rule 8’s plead-
ing standards and that (2) because Twombly’s plausibility standard
superseded the previous Conley standard, if plausibility pleading is not ex-
tended to affirmative defenses, courts will be unable to evaluate the suffi-
ciency of such pleadings in the face of a Rule 12(f)27 motion to strike.
The plausibility courts28 that advance a basic fairness argument typically
cite precedent from the Conley era, during which time circuit courts agreed
that “[a]n affirmative defense is subject to the same pleading requirements
as is the complaint,”29 or they quote Charles Wright and Arthur Miller’s
similar pre-Twombly acknowledgment that complaints and affirmative de-
fenses were held to an identical notice pleading standard.30 Since circuit
courts applied the Conley standard uniformly to both complaints and af-
firmative defenses, the plausibility courts reason, the new Twombly plausibil-
ity standard must similarly create symmetrical pleading standards for
plaintiffs and defendants.
The Northern District of California decisions on affirmative defense
pleading standards—which have thus far unanimously adopted symmetrical
plausibility pleading31—follow this line of historical reasoning.32 While these
decisions augment their appeal to past practice with additional textual and
policy arguments, as discussed below,33 they demonstrate how heavily plau-
sibility courts rely on pleading practices under Conley to justify extending
Twombly’s standard for complaints to affirmative defenses.
26. Godson v. Eltman, Eltman & Cooper, P.C., 285 F.R.D. 255, 258 (W.D.N.Y. 2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Racick v. Dominion Law Assocs., 270 F.R.D. 228,
233 (E.D.N.C. 2010)).
27. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
28. See, e.g., HCRI TRS Acquirer, LLC v. Iwer, 708 F. Supp. 2d 687, 691 (N.D. Ohio
2010) (“[T]he pleading requirements for affirmative defenses are the same as for claims of
relief.”).
29. Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 362 (5th Cir. 1999).
30. 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Proce-
dure § 1274 (3d ed. 2004) (“The general rules of pleading that are applicable to the statement
of a claim also govern the statement of affirmative defenses under Federal Rule 8(c).”).
31. See Powertech Tech., Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., No. C 10-945 CW, 2012 WL 1746848, at
*4 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2012) (“Within the Northern District of California, it appears that the
judges who have decided the issue thus far have uniformly found that the Twombly and Iqbal
standard does apply to affirmative defenses.”).
32. The Powertech court reasoned that since “ ‘the Ninth Circuit [had] applied the Con-
ley pleading standard for complaints to the pleading of affirmative defenses,’ ” and Twombly
simply “changed the legal foundation” provided by Conley for determining when a pleading
provides fair notice, Twombly’s new standard should apply to both complaints and affirmative
defenses, just as Conley’s standard did before it. Id. (quoting Perez v. Gordon & Wong Law
Grp., P.C., No. 11-CV-03323-LHK, 2012 WL 1029425, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012)).
33. See infra Sections I.A.2–3.
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The plausibility courts’ reliance on historically symmetrical pleading
standards gives rise to a second, related argument. They assert that unless
Twombly’s plausibility standard is extended to affirmative defense pleading,
courts will not be able to “make a . . . determination on whether an affirma-
tive defense is adequately pleaded” when challenged by a Rule 12(f) motion
to strike.34 This argument can be traced back to United States v. Quadrini,35
one of the first cases to consider affirmative defense pleading standards in
the months following Twombly, and it rests on two key assumptions arising
from pleading practices under Conley.
First, the Quadrini decision and courts that follow it assume, based on
pre-Twombly precedent, that affirmative defenses challenged under Rule
12(f) are “tested under a standard identical to Rule 12(b)(6).”36 This as-
sumption stems from the fact that the circuit courts applied Conley’s per-
missive pleading standard to both complaints and affirmative defenses.37
These courts accordingly saw a challenge to a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6)
as the “mirror image” of a challenge to an affirmative defense under Rule
12(f).38 Based on this Conley-era understanding that Rules 12(f) and
12(b)(6) are inextricably linked to a single, symmetrical pleading standard,
the Quadrini court reasoned that Twombly’s plausibility standard for plain-
tiffs’ complaints “must also apply to defendants in pleading affirmative de-
fenses,” or motions to strike would cease to function.39
Second, at least one commentator has suggested that Quadrini stands
for the proposition that since “Twombly rejects . . . Conley and requires” that
pleaders show a “ ‘plausible’ claim of relief,”40 courts can “no longer employ
Conley on a Rule 12(f) motion to strike affirmative defenses, but must in-
stead apply Twombly.”41 Plausibility courts that follow Quadrini’s reasoning
argue that even if extant Rule 12 precedent allowed courts to apply different
pleading standards to complaints and affirmative defenses, courts would
34. United States v. Quadrini, 69 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 953, 958 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
35. See id. at 958 (“This clarification by the Supreme Court that a plaintiff must plead
sufficient facts to demonstrate a plausible claim . . . cannot be a pleading standard that applies
only to plaintiffs. It must also apply to defendants in pleading affirmative defenses, otherwise a
court could not make a Rule 12(f) determination on whether an affirmative defense is ade-
quately pleaded . . . .”); see also Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 650 (D. Kan.
2009) (following Quadrini’s reasoning).
36. Bobbitt v. Victorian House, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 734, 737 (N.D. Ill. 1982); accord
Renalds v. S.R.G. Rest. Grp., 119 F. Supp. 2d 800, 802 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (“[A]ffirmative defenses
must meet the standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) . . . .”).
37. See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text.
38. Solvent Chem. Co. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 242 F. Supp. 2d 196, 212
(W.D.N.Y. 2002) (“The standard for striking an affirmative defense is the mirror image of the
standard for considering whether to dismiss for failure to state a claim.”).
39. Quadrini, 69 Fed. R. Serv. 3d at 958.
40. Id.
41. Dominguez et al., supra note 19, at 78.
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nevertheless be foreclosed from applying Conley’s original permissive plead-
ing standard since it was abrogated by Twombly.42
2. The Twombly Interpretation of Fair Notice Applies to Rule 8
Generally
Although appeals to fairness premised on pleading practices under Con-
ley are the most common arguments that the plausibility courts marshal in
support of extending Twombly’s pleading standard to affirmative defenses,43
these courts also purport to anchor their decisions in the language of
Twombly and the text of the Federal Rules. Despite the fact that Twombly and
Iqbal focused specifically on Rule 8(a),44 the plausibility courts argue that
“[s]imilar language is used in Rule 8 to describe the requirements for plead-
ing both claims in a complaint and defenses in an answer.”45 Specifically, the
plausibility courts point to Rule 8(a)’s language requiring “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”46 and
Rule 8(b)’s language requiring a defendant to “state in short and plain terms
its defenses to each claim asserted against it.”47 These courts highlight the
shared “short and plain statement” language of Rules 8(a) and 8(b) to make
a larger point: regardless of the type of pleading in question, “the purpose of
Rule 8 was to give the opposing party notice of the basis for the claim
sought.”48 They claim that Twombly redefined the meaning of the term “fair
notice” as it applied to Rule 8 generally.49 Since Rules 8(a) and 8(b) both
require litigants to provide short and plain statements that give the opposing
party “fair notice” of their assertions, if Twombly generally redefined “fair
notice” to require plausibility pleading, then plausibility applies to com-
plaints and defenses alike.50
42. Tracy v. NVR, Inc., No. 04-CV-6541L, 2009 WL 3153150, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,
2009) (“Indeed, the Twombly plausibility standard applies with equal force to a motion to
strike an affirmative defense under Rule 12(f).”), report and recommendation adopted by 667 F.
Supp. 2d 244 (W.D.N.Y. 2009).
43. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text.
44. See supra notes 9–13 and accompanying text.
45. Bradshaw v. Hilco Receivables, LLC, 725 F. Supp. 2d 532, 536–37 (D. Md. 2010).
46. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
47. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1)(a).
48. O’Sullivan v. AMN Servs., Inc., No. C-12-02125 JCS, 2012 WL 2912061, at *7 (N.D.
Cal. July 16, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Barnes v. AT&T Pension Ben-
efit Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2010)).
49. See, e.g., Perez v. Gordon & Wong Law Grp., P.C., No. 11-CV-03323-LHK, 2012 WL
1029425, *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012) (holding that Twombly reconceptualized the meaning of
fair notice and that complaints and defenses alike must give the opposing party fair notice);
accord Miller, supra note 15, at 101 n.391 (“Courts that read the decisions as a clarification of
what information is necessary to provide fair notice to the other party extend the plausibility
standard to the pleading of affirmative defenses.”).
50. See Perez, 2012 WL 1029425, at *7 (“[I]n light of Twombly and Iqbal’s reconceptual-
ization of fair notice pleading, the Court agrees that ‘[a]pplying the standard for heightened
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Several plausibility courts51 have bolstered their claim that Twombly re-
interpreted Rule 8’s overarching “fair notice” standard by referencing the
forms appended to the Federal Rules under Rule 84.52 They assert that Form
30 directs defendants to plead facts outlining the relevant statute of limita-
tions barring the opposing party’s action: “The plaintiff’s claim is barred by
the statute of limitations because it arose more than ___ years before this
action was commenced.”53 Given that Rule 84 was meant to “illustrate the
simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate,”54 these plausibility
courts argue that Form 30’s requirement that a plaintiff fill in the statute of
limitations “strongly suggests that bare-bones assertions of at least some af-
firmative defenses will not suffice.” They therefore hold that parties pleading
affirmative defenses must now include “the additional factual detail” that
Twombly requires in the pleading of complaints.55
Plausibility courts have also reinforced their position that Twombly gen-
erally redefined Rule 8’s “fair notice” requirement by noting that Rule 8(c)
allocates the burden of proof in affirmative defense pleading to the defen-
dant.56 These courts hold that Twombly’s pleading standard represented an
admonition that “fair notice pleading under Rule 8 is not intended to give
parties free license to engage in unfounded fishing expeditions on matters
for which they bear the burden of proof at trial.”57 Therefore, such courts
find that “in light of the fact that the defendant bears the burden of proof on
an affirmative defense, as the plaintiff does on a claim for relief, ‘Twombly’s
rationale of giving fair notice to the opposing party would seem to apply as
pleading to affirmative defenses serves a valid purpose . . . .’ ” (second alteration in original)
(quoting Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 650 (D. Kan. 2009))).
51. See, e.g., Aguilar v. City Lights of China Rest., Inc., No. DKC 11-2416, 2011 WL
5118325, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 24, 2011); Barry v. EMC Mortg., No. DKC 10-3120, 2011 WL
4352104, at *3 (D. Md. Sept. 15, 2011); Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., No. 3:09CV-737, 2010
WL 2990159, at *8 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2010); Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647,
651 (D. Kan. 2009).
52. Fed. R. Civ. P. 84.
53. Fed. R. Civ. P. Form 30.
54. Fed. R. Civ. P. 84.
55. Barry, 2011 WL 4352104, at *3.
56. Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he moving party
has the burden—the plaintiff on a claim for relief or the defendant on an affirmative de-
fense . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting William W. Schwarzer, Summary
Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 488 (1984)));
accord Kanne v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 489, 492 n.4 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that
the defendant bears the burden of proof on an affirmative defense, just as the plaintiff bears
the burden of proof on a claim for relief); Ansari v. Elec. Document Processing, Inc., No. 5:12-
CV-01245-LHK, 2012 WL 3945482, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2012) (“The defendant bears the
burden of proof on an affirmative defense.”).
57. Perez v. Gordon & Wong Law Grp., P.C., No. 11-CV-03323-LHK, 2012 WL
1029425, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012).
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well to affirmative defenses.’ ”58 This line of reasoning, which has been em-
ployed since the first wave of district courts began to consider the appropri-
ate pleading standard for affirmative defenses post-Twombly, advances the
straightforward proposition that any party bearing the burden of proof on
an issue must meet Twombly’s plausibility requirement to provide “fair no-
tice” on that issue.59
3. Extending Plausibility Pleading to Affirmative Defenses Furthers the
Policy Goals That Motivated Twombly and Iqbal
District courts that extend plausibility pleading to affirmative defenses
routinely claim that such an extension furthers the policy goals that moti-
vated Twombly.60 These courts emphasize that Twombly implemented plausi-
bility pleading in an effort to weed out frivolous claims “at the point of
minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.”61
Given this stated goal of quickly and inexpensively dismissing frivolous com-
plaints that in turn lead to costly discovery, the plausibility courts assert that
Twombly was motivated by a general policy of “encouraging efficiency and
limiting costs” through a heightened pleading standard.62
After attributing this general policy goal of litigation efficiency to
Twombly, the plausibility courts then assert that heightened pleading should
not only be used to address the pleading of frivolous complaints but also to
deal with the “boilerplate listing of affirmative defenses which is common-
place in most defendants’ pleadings where many of the defenses alleged are
irrelevant to the claims asserted.”63 The plausibility courts analogize the
problem addressed by the Court in Twombly—frivolous complaints that un-
necessarily unlock the doors to discovery and impose high costs on defend-
ants—with a separate problem that these district courts have identified—
58. Powertech Tech., Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., No. C 10-945 CW, 2012 WL 1746848, at *4
(N.D. Cal. May 16, 2012) (quoting Barnes & Noble, Inc. v. LSI Corp., No. C-11-2709 EMC,
2012 WL 359713, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2012)); accord Ansari, 2012 WL 3945482, at *3.
59. Shinew v. Wszola, No. 08-14256, 2009 WL 1076279, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 21,
2009) (“I conclude that the Supreme Court has established a general standard of pleading
matters upon which the pleader assumes the burden of proof.”).
60. Hansen v. R.I.’s Only 24 Hour Truck & Auto Plaza, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 119, 122–23 (D.
Mass. 2012) (“Courts that have applied the heightened pleading standard to affirmative de-
fenses have often done so on the basis that Twombly aimed to eliminate the high costs of
discovery associated with boilerplate claims and that boilerplate affirmative defenses have the
same detrimental effect on the cost of litigation.”).
61. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Wright & Miller, supra note 30, § 1216).
62. Godson v. Eltman, Eltman & Cooper, P.C., 285 F.R.D. 255, 258 (W.D.N.Y. 2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wright & Miller, supra note 30, § 1274).
63. Barnes v. AT&T Pension Benefit Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d
1167, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2010); accord Ear v. Empire Collection Auths., Inc., No. 12-1695-SC,
2012 WL 3249514, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2012); HCRI TRS Acquirer, LLC v. Iwer, 708 F.
Supp. 2d 687, 691 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (“Boilerplate affirmative defenses that provide little or no
factual support can have the same detrimental effect on the cost of litigation as poorly worded
complaints.”).
November 2013] Affirmative Defenses 285
namely, boilerplate defense pleading. These courts consequently extend the
reach of Twombly’s comparatively rigorous interpretation of Rule 8(a)’s
pleading standard to address affirmative defenses that they have determined
“clutter” their dockets.64
B. Arguments Against Extending Plausibility Pleading
A rapidly growing number of district courts, however, have ruled that
Twombly’s plausibility standard for complaints under Rule 8(a) does not ap-
ply to affirmative defenses under Rule 8(c); although “a majority of early
cases applied the heightened standard, this is now the minority approach.”65
These declining courts advance numerous reasons why the plausibility stan-
dard should be confined to the complaint,66 but they most commonly cite
two principal arguments: (1) a textual analysis of Rule 8 and Twombly itself
cuts against the plausibility standard’s application to affirmative defenses,67
and (2) the time constraints that the Federal Rules place on defendants in
pleading affirmative defenses necessitate that courts apply different pleading
standards to plaintiffs and defendants.68
1. A Textual Analysis of Rule 8 and Twombly Does Not Support
Application of Plausibility Pleading to Affirmative Defenses
The declining courts typically base their decision not to extend
Twombly’s plausibility standard to affirmative defense pleadings on the text
of Rule 8 and the language of Twombly itself. First, they stress that in addi-
tion to the shared “short and plain statement” language found in Rules 8(a)
and 8(b),69 Rule 8(a) also requires that a complaint provide a “statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,”70 whereas Rules 8(b)
64. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. O’Hara Corp., No. 08-CV-10545, 2008 WL 2558015, at *1
(E.D. Mich. June 25, 2008).
65. Hansen, 287 F.R.D. at 122; see also Tiscareno v. Frasier, No. 2:07-CV-336, 2012 WL
1377886, at *17 n.4 (D. Utah Apr. 19, 2012) (“Plaintiffs argue, and several courts have sug-
gested, that the majority approach has been to apply the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard to
affirmative defenses. . . . [I]t is unclear whether that approach is still a majority position.”).
66. See, e.g., Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, No. 10-1045 RMB/JS,
2011 WL 6934557, at *1–2 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 2011) (listing nine common reasons why the
declining courts apply Twombly exclusively to Rule 8(a)).
67. See, e.g., Hansen, 287 F.R.D. at 122 (“The most prevalent argument made by district
courts against the heightened standard, however, relies on the text of Rule 8 . . . .”).
68. See, e.g., EEOC v. Joe Ryan Enters., Inc., 281 F.R.D. 660, 663 n.2 (M.D. Ala. 2012)
(“[M]any of the district courts to have rejected Twombly/Iqbal in the affirmative defense set-
ting . . . [note the] disparate amount of time a plaintiff has to research and draft a complaint
compared to the amount of time for a defendant to research and draft an answer.”).
69. See supra notes 45–50 and accompanying text.
70. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added).
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and 8(c) only require that a party “state”71 its defenses, conspicuously omit-
ting any “showing” language.72 Second, these courts emphasize that both
Twombly and Iqbal focused exclusively on Rule 8(a)(2), explicitly interpret-
ing the Rule’s unique “showing” language.73 At least one court has rein-
forced this textual interpretation of Twombly by noting that the Twombly
majority responded in a footnote to the dissent’s protest that the Federal
Rules had abolished fact pleading by specifically stating that “Rule 8(a)(2)
still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to
relief.”74
The declining courts reason that since “Rule 8 is the bedrock of modern
notice pleading, and one consistency to be found in the Supreme Court’s
decisions—from Conley v. Gibson through Ashcroft v. Iqbal—is a steadfast
fidelity to the text of Rule 8,” the fact that the Court focused on Rule 8(a)’s
“showing” language is “significant.”75 This reasoning leads to the simple
conclusion that when the Court reinterpreted Rule 8(a)’s pleading standard,
it meant only to reinterpret Rule 8(a)’s pleading standard—not Rule 8(c)’s.76
2. Time Constraints Unfairly Burden Defendants’ Pleading Plausibly
Although the wording of Rule 8 and the Court’s language in Twombly
generally provides sufficient reason for declining courts to refrain from ex-
tending plausibility pleading to affirmative defenses, these courts usually
buttress their textual rationale with a practical one as well.77 Many declining
courts cite Rule 12’s directive that “[a] defendant must answer . . . within 21
days after being served with the summons and complaint”78 and subse-
quently hold that “it is reasonable to impose stricter pleading requirements
on a plaintiff who has significantly more time to develop factual support for
his claims than a defendant who is only given [21] days to respond to a
complaint and assert its affirmative defenses.”79 The declining courts con-
sider it unreasonable to expect a defendant to find a lawyer or mobilize in-
71. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1)(a), 8(c)(1).
72. See Hansen, 287 F.R.D. at 122 (“Subsections 8(b) and (c), on the other hand, re-
quire only that a defendant ‘state’ her defense.”); Miller, supra note 15, at 101 (“Neither Rule
8(b) nor Rule 8(c) contains the magic word ‘showing’ . . . .”).
73. See supra notes 5–13 and accompanying text.
74. EEOC v. Joe Ryan Enters., Inc., 281 F.R.D. 660, 662–63 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3 (2007)).
75. Id. at 662.
76. Hansen, 287 F.R.D. at 122 (“Twombly and Iqbal were decided under Rule 8(a)(2)
and the Court is therefore hesitant to extend the holding of those cases to Rule 8(c) given that
the drafters used different language in the sub-sections.”).
77. See Joe Ryan Enters., 281 F.R.D. at 663 (“[P]olicy considerations are foreclosed
when the language of the Rule is clear.”); id. at 663 n.2 (“With that said, many of the district
courts to have rejected Twombly/Iqbal in the affirmative defense setting have found sound
reasons to hold responding defendants to a lower pleading standard . . . .”).
78. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i).
79. Kohler v. Islands Rests., LP, 280 F.R.D. 560, 566 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Holdbrook v. SAIA Motor Freight Line,
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house counsel, conduct an investigation, and then plead all relevant affirma-
tive defenses in plausible factual detail within a mere twenty-one days of
service, after which time the defendant automatically waives all unpled de-
fenses pursuant to Rule 12(h).80 They find this consideration especially com-
pelling given that a plaintiff may conduct its investigation into the facts
relevant to litigation over the course of several years, subject only to the
applicable statute of limitations.81 Declining courts therefore hold that
“[a]ny potential efficiency gained by applying Twombly does not outweigh
the burden on defendants,” and they refuse to extend plausibility pleading
beyond the complaint.82
An analysis of the declining courts’ unfair time constraint argument
would be incomplete without mentioning the plausibility courts’ immediate
counterargument; the latter courts consistently respond that any prejudice
to defendants who are required to plausibly plead their defenses within
twenty-one days is ameliorated by a court’s ability to liberally grant leave to
amend under Rule 15.83 The plausibility courts assert that “[u]nless it would
prejudice the opposing party, courts freely grant leave to amend stricken
pleadings.”84 The negative implications for discovery of such defenses dis-
missed with leave to amend, however, are rarely explored.85 This Note pro-
vides the most comprehensive analysis of the issue to date in Section II.C.
II. A Response to the Plausibility Courts
This Part exposes several fundamental flaws in the reasoning of the
courts that extend Twombly’s plausibility standard to the pleading of affirm-
ative defenses. Section II.A examines the historically motivated non sequitur
underlying the plausibility courts’ pervasive “basic fairness” argument. Sec-
tion II.B deconstructs the plausibility courts’ general interpretation of “fair
notice.” And Section II.C responds to the widespread assertion that Rule
15’s liberal amendment procedures ameliorate the harshness inherent in
holding defendants to the plausibility standard, reimagining the basic fair-
ness argument in the context of defendants’ access to discovery.
LLC, No. 09-CV-02870-LTB-BNB, 2010 WL 865380, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 8, 2010)); accord
Florida v. DLT 3 Girls, Inc., No. 4:11-CV-3624, 2012 WL 1565533, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 2,
2012) (“[A] different standard for plaintiffs and defendants is sensible, given that defendants
have only 21 days within which to serve an answer.”).
80. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1).
81. See, e.g., Tiscareno v. Frasier, No. 2:07-CV-336, 2012 WL 1377886, at *15 (D. Utah
Apr. 19, 2012) (“If a defendant fails to include an affirmative defense in her answer, she risks
waiving it. In contrast, plaintiffs may take years to gather facts and investigate legal claims to
prepare a proper complaint.” (citation omitted)).
82. Hansen v. R.I.’s Only 24 Hour Truck & Auto Plaza, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 119, 123 (D.
Mass. 2012).
83. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (“[A] party may amend its pleading . . . [with] the court’s
leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”).
84. E.g., Kohler, 280 F.R.D. at 564.
85. See infra Section II.C.
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A. The Historical Precedent Fallacy
The historically motivated basic fairness argument86 most commonly
cited by the plausibility courts in justifying their application of Twombly to
affirmative defenses is premised on two fundamental errors. First, the appeal
to pleading standards under Conley supporting this basic fairness argu-
ment87 is a non sequitur. Second, the plausibility courts’ related argument—
pioneered by the Quadrini decision—that asymmetrical pleading standards
will hopelessly confuse Rule 12(f) motions to strike88 misreads Twombly.
The rationale for applying Conley’s relaxed notice pleading standard
symmetrically to complaints and affirmative defenses does not automatically
support a similarly uniform application of the heightened plausibility stan-
dard. The questions presented by the two pleading regimes are separate. The
pre-Twombly Wright and Miller treatise that plausibility courts frequently
cite89 in support of symmetrical standards draws attention to this non se-
quitur in the sentence following its well-known pronouncement that “[t]he
general rules of pleading that are applicable to the statement of a claim also
govern the statement of affirmative defenses under Federal Rule 8(c).”90
Writing in the context of Conley’s loose notice pleading standard, Wright
and Miller then reason that “[a]s one district court has remarked: I have no
doubt that the requirements for an affirmative defense are no more stringent
than those for a complaint.”91
The plausibility courts uniformly ignore this sentence in their opinions;
it significantly undermines their position. The fact that the requirements for
pleading an affirmative defense are no more stringent than the requirements
for pleading a complaint only means that the courts under Conley saw no
reason to hold defendants to a higher standard than plaintiffs; it does not
mean that heightening the pleading standard for plaintiffs, as the Court did
in Twombly, necessarily heightens that standard for defendants.92 Plausibility
86. See supra Section I.A.1.
87. See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., HCRI TRS Acquirer, LLC v. Iwer, 708 F. Supp. 2d 687, 691 (N.D. Ohio
2010); Shinew v. Wszola, No. 08-14256, 2009 WL 1076279, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 21, 2009).
90. Wright & Miller, supra note 30, § 1274; accord Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d
354, 362 (5th Cir. 1999).
91. Wright & Miller, supra note 30, § 1274 (quoting Lehmann Trading Corp. v. J &
H Stolow, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 21, 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)).
92. See Jones v. JGC Dallas LLC, No. 3:11-CV-2743-O, 2012 WL 4119570, at *3–4
(N.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2012) (“Although the Fifth Circuit has previously observed that affirmative
defenses are subject to the same pleading requirements applicable to complaints, it has not
clarified whether this observation still holds true under Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility stan-
dard.”), report and recommendation adopted by No. 3:11-CV-2743-O, 2012 WL 4169685 (N.D.
Tex. Sept. 19, 2012); EEOC v. Courtesy Bldg. Servs., Inc., No. 3:10-CV-1911-D, 2011 WL
208408, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 2011) (“Although Woodfield noted at the time that ‘[a]n
affirmative defense is subject to the same pleading requirements as is the complaint,’ it is
unclear whether this observation still holds true under the plausibility standard of Twombly
and Iqbal.” (quoting Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 362 (5th Cir. 1999))).
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pleading by definition imposes a different set of burdens on litigants than
did Conley’s notice pleading standard, and those burdens affect plaintiffs
and defendants asymmetrically. It does not follow that because symmetrical
standards worked under Conley, they must also necessarily work under
Twombly.93
The plausibility courts’ related holding based on pleading practices
under Conley—that motions to strike under Rule 12(f) depend on the sym-
metrical application of pleading standards to complaints and defenses94—
similarly fails for two reasons. First, the common understanding that the
standard for dismissing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) and the standard
for striking a defense under Rule 12(f) are “mirror images”95 of each other
arises from the faulty appeal to historical practice discussed above. Given
that widespread acceptance of symmetrical notice pleading standards under
Conley does not speak to whether plausibility pleading should similarly be
symmetrical, nothing in current affirmative defense pleading jurisprudence
bars courts from evaluating Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(f) motions by sepa-
rate standards.
Second, the plausibility courts’ remaining contention—that even grant-
ing the acceptability of asymmetrical standards for motions to strike under
Rule 12, Twombly rendered Conley’s older notice pleading standard a dead
letter96—fails because it misreads Twombly. Rather than abrogating Conley as
a whole, the Court carefully noted in Twombly that it was only retiring
“Conley’s ‘no set of facts’ language.”97 The Court confined its decision to
redefining what “[Rule] 8(a)(2) requires” in order to “give the defendant fair
notice”98 of the claim asserted against it.99 Nothing in the Court’s decision
indicates that “since Twombly abrogated the Conley pleading standard,
courts can no longer employ Conley on a Rule 12(f) motion to strike affirm-
ative defenses.”100 Quadrini’s misreading of Twombly notwithstanding,
93. See Petroci v. Transworld Sys., Inc., No. 12-CV-00729 (A)(M), 2012 WL 5464597, at
*2 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2012) (holding that symmetrical pleading standards no longer make
sense given the asymmetrical burden plausibility pleading places on defendants), report and
recommendation adopted by No. 12-CV-729A, 2012 WL 5464579 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2012).
94. See supra Section I.A.2.
95. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
97. The Court saw this language as an “incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted
pleading standard” meant to illustrate “the breadth of opportunity to prove what an adequate
complaint claims, not the minimum standard of adequate pleading to govern a complaint’s
survival.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562–63 (2007).
98. Id. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), abrogated in part on
other grounds by Twombly, 550 U.S. 544).
99. See Gambol, supra note 19, at 2207 (“Twombly itself did not fully overrule Conley,
but rather only Conley’s ‘no set of facts’ language. The remainder of Conley remains good
law.” (footnote omitted)).
100. Dominguez et al., supra note 19, at 78 (interpreting Quadrini to hold that Conley is
a dead letter).
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courts are free to apply Conley’s comparatively loose notice pleading stan-
dard to affirmative defenses under Rule 8(c) while simultaneously adhering
to Twombly’s requirements for the pleading of complaints under Rule
8(a)(2).101
B. The Fiction of a General “Fair Notice” Pleading Standard
The debate between the plausibility courts and the declining courts over
whether Twombly interprets Rule 8 generally102 or Rule 8(a) specifically103
cannot be resolved without first identifying a fundamental difference in the
approaches employed by the two sides. Unlike the courts that narrowly apply
Twombly to the complaint, the plausibility courts hold that Twombly
changed the “fair notice” requirement applicable to all pleadings. These
plausibility courts fail to recognize the basic principle that a legal term can
take on different meanings in different—although closely related—con-
texts.104 The argument that Twombly generally redefined “fair notice” fails
due to its reliance on the unfounded assumption that the Court applies a
monolithic “fair notice” requirement to Rule 8 as a whole. The plausibility
courts’ attempts to derive support for this position from the model pleading
forms provided through Rule 84 similarly fall short.
In asserting that Twombly’s pleading standard is “a clarification of what
information is necessary to provide fair notice to the other party,”105 the
plausibility courts attempt to avoid the inconvenient fact that Twombly
anchors its pleading standard in language specific to Rule 8(a).106 They argue
instead that “Twombly’s rationale of giving fair notice to the opposing party”
applies equally to the pleading of affirmative defenses and complaints.107 By
claiming that the overarching goal of providing “fair notice” applies to all
101. A growing number of district courts have adopted this approach, applying Conley
to affirmative defenses and Twombly to complaints. See, e.g., EEOC v. Joe Ryan Enters., Inc.,
281 F.R.D. 660, 664 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (refusing to extend Twombly to affirmative defenses and
instead evaluating affirmative defenses under Conley’s original fair notice standard); Baroness
Small Estates, Inc. v. BJ’s Rests., Inc., No. SACV 11-00468-JST (Ex), 2011 WL 3438873, at *6
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011) (applying fair notice rather than plausibility pleading to affirmative
defenses); Tyco Fire Prods. LP v. Victaulic Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893, 900–01 (E.D. Pa. 2011)
(declining to apply Twombly to affirmative defenses and reverting to the original Conley
standard).
102. See supra Section I.A.2.
103. See supra Section I.B.1.
104. Chief Justice Roberts reminded us forcefully of this principle in his opinion up-
holding the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”). See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep.
Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2584, 2594–96 (2012) (declining to define the PPACA as a tax
for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act while simultaneously identifying the PPACA as a tax
in its Spending Clause analysis).
105. Miller, supra note 15, at 101 n.391.
106. See Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-226-MP-GRJ, 2012 WL 2377840,
at *2 (N.D. Fla. June 25, 2012) (“The Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal relied on the
specific language of Rule 8(a)(2), which requires a ‘showing’ of entitlement to relief, when it
established the plausibility requirement for complaints.”).
107. Barnes & Noble, Inc. v. LSI Corp., 849 F. Supp. 2d 925, 929 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
November 2013] Affirmative Defenses 291
aspects of pleading,108 the plausibility courts use this term as a vehicle for
importing Twombly’s pleading standard into Rules 8(b) and 8(c), circum-
venting the lack of “showing” language in either of those subsections.
There are two problems with this approach. First, the term “fair notice”
appears nowhere in the text of Rule 8—the Court introduced the term in
Conley as a gloss on the goals underlying Rule 8(a)(2)109 and never indicated
in Twombly that it was expanding or reinterpreting those goals to apply to
Rule 8 generally. Second, and even more importantly, the plausibility courts
fail to consider that the Court can prescribe one set of “fair notice” require-
ments for pleadings under Rule 8(a) while prescribing a separate set of “fair
notice” requirements for pleadings under Rule 8(c).110 As the declining
courts repeatedly emphasize,111 the text of Twombly112 indicates that the
Court did just that—redefining what “fair notice” meant in the context of
the complaint, while leaving the original meaning of “fair notice” undis-
turbed in the context of defenses.113
In order to reinforce their tenuous claim that Twombly heightened the
“fair notice” requirement for all Rule 8 pleadings, the plausibility courts
often assert that Form 30 directs litigants to provide plausible factual detail
when stating affirmative defenses,114 but the declining courts have over-
whelmingly repudiated this argument for reasons apparent on the face of the
Form.115 The first and most obvious refutation of the plausibility courts’
108. See Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Davis, No. C 11-6166 CW, 2012 WL 4803923, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2012) (noting that Twombly “departed from Conley and redefined the
pleading requirements under Rule 8”).
109. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (“[A]ll the Rules require is ‘a short and
plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2))), abrogated in part by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
110. This is no different than defining the PPACA as a tax for purposes of the Spending
Clause while declining to define it as a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act; the Court
can and does define legal terms like “fair notice” and “tax” contextually. See Nat’l Fed’n of
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2584, 2594–96 (2012).
111. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
112. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (“Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests . . . .’ ” (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47)).
113. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text. Commentators have gone so far as
to claim that “Form 30 provides the strongest argument in favor of applying plausibility stan-
dards to defendants.” Goff & Bales, supra note 19, at 637.
115. E.g., Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, No. 10-1045 RMB/JS, 2011
WL 6934557, at *1–2 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 2011) (holding that “the lack of detail in Form 30,
which demonstrates the appropriate pleading of an affirmative defense,” provides evidence
that Twombly does not apply to affirmative defenses); Falley v. Friends Univ., 787 F. Supp. 2d
1255, 1258 (D. Kan. 2011) (finding support for its holding that Twombly does not apply to
affirmative defenses in the “brief and simple nature” of the language in Form 30); Tyco Fire
Prods. LP v. Victaulic Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893, 900 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (describing Form 30 as
containing “undetailed recitations of affirmative defenses”).
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reliance on Form 30 is the fact that the Form was composed prior to the
Twombly decision, and while it became effective a few months after the opin-
ion was handed down, it is highly unlikely that the Rules Committee drafters
intended to illustrate a pleading standard not yet in existence.116 This argu-
ment is confirmed by reference to Form 30’s predecessor, the pre–Style Pro-
ject Form 20, which illustrated Conley’s relaxed pleading standard and
included the same level of detail as the current Form 30.117
At least one plausibility court recognized this weakness yet still claimed
that “the additional factual detail contained in Form 30 is hardly superflu-
ous,” suggesting that Twombly “merely made explicit principles long implicit
in the general pleading requirements of the Federal Rules.”118 But the asser-
tion that Form 30 requires “factual detail” is demonstrably false.119 While
several courts point to Form 30, which indicates that defendants should
plead the number of years passed prior to the commencement of the action,
as evidence that affirmative defenses must include plausible specifics,120 such
an assertion stems from a shallow and inaccurate reading of the Form.121 Far
from requiring specific factual detail, Form 30 “suggests stating that the ac-
tion ‘arose more than ___ years’ before the case was commenced,” and
“[t]he use of ‘more than’ does not call for the pleader to state when the
action factually arose; it only calls for the pleader to state the relevant limita-
tions period governing the plaintiff’s claim.”122 This “more than” language,
116. Form 30 was added on April 30, 2007, and became effective on December 1, 2007.
Fed. R. Civ. P. Form 30. Twombly was decided on May 21, 2007. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
117. See Fed. R. Civ. P. Form 20 (2006) (superseded 2007) (“Fourth Defense[:] The
right of action set forth in the complaint did not accrue within six years next before the
commencement of this action.”). Furthermore, the Style Project, which led to Form 30’s inclu-
sion in the Federal Rules, was stylistic only, so by definition Form 30 cannot illustrate a sub-
stantively new pleading standard. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 advisory committee’s note, 2007
Amend. (“The language . . . has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Civil
Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent
throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only.”).
118. Aguilar v. City Lights of China Rest., Inc., No. DKC 11-2416, 2011 WL 5118325, at
*3 (D. Md. Oct. 24, 2011).
119. See EEOC v. Joe Ryan Enters., Inc., 281 F.R.D. 660, 664 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (“Form
30’s suggestion for . . . [an] affirmative defense could not be more bare-bones . . . . [I]t would
be difficult to imagine any affirmative defense that defies more strongly Twombly’s instruction
to plead ‘more than labels and conclusions’ than Form 30’s example . . . .” (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555)).
120. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text.
121. See Joe Ryan Enters., 281 F.R.D. at 664.
122. Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. Form 30) (“That both defenses listed in Form 30
would be laughed out of court under Twombly/Iqbal impresses strongly against extracting the
principles from those cases and applying them in the different context of affirmative de-
fenses.”); cf. Tiscareno v. Frasier, No. 2:07-CV-336, 2012 WL 1377886, at *15 (D. Utah Apr.
19, 2012) (“The fact that a simple statement that a complaint ‘fails to state a claim’ is sufficient
to plead an affirmative defense under the federal rules, even in the absence of additional fac-
tual allegations, suggests that the heightened Twombly/Iqbal standard was not intended to be
extended to affirmative defenses.”).
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which only calls for a statement of the relevant limitations period by impli-
cation,123 does not suggest the sort of details that would arguably be required
to meet the plausibility standard. Read in conjunction with the fact that the
Form’s meaning has not changed since the Conley era,124 the language of the
Form itself demonstrates that the plausibility courts cannot reasonably rely
on Form 30 to strengthen their claim that Twombly heightened the “fair
notice” requirement for pleading affirmative defenses.
C. The Basic Fairness Argument Reimagined in a Discovery Context
While the first wave of courts to consider the application of Twombly to
affirmative defenses often cited “basic fairness” as a reason for applying
plausibility pleading symmetrically to complaints and defenses,125 such a po-
sition overlooked Rule 8’s broader relationship to the other Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. This oversight ironically led the plausibility courts to im-
pose an unfairly onerous burden on defendants and contradicted the same
basic fairness principle these courts originally invoked.
The dispute between the plausibility courts and the declining courts
over whether applying Twombly to affirmative defenses unfairly disadvan-
tages one set of litigants over the other takes place at two different levels of
complexity. The superficial formulation of the dispute involves the declining
courts’ contention that defendants are only allowed twenty-one days to file
their answer, whereas plaintiffs are limited only by the relevant statute of
limitations.126 The plausibility courts reply that this perceived unfairness is
obviated by the courts’ routine practice of liberally granting leave to amend
under Rule 15.127
The more complex formulation of this dispute, which has received far
less attention from courts and scholars128 and comes closer to actually
resolving the two sides’ basic fairness argument, questions whether litigants
123. The Form simply leaves a blank space into which the defendant can insert a year.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. Form 30. It does not require—even by implication—that the defendant
state why that particular year applies (e.g., because the claim arises out of tort or contract law),
nor does it require factual details about when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the
existence of the cause of action, which would arguably be required to meet the plausibility
standard in pleading a statute of limitations defense to certain suits (e.g., medical malpractice
suits). See, e.g., Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So. 2d 177, 179 (Fla. 1993) (“An action for medical
malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the
action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been
discovered with the exercise of due diligence.”).
124. See supra notes 116–117 and accompanying text.
125. See supra Section I.A.1.
126. See supra Section I.B.2.
127. See, e.g., Racick v. Dominion Law Assocs., 270 F.R.D. 228, 234 (E.D.N.C. 2010)
(“The court also notes that applying the same pleading requirements to defendants should not
stymie the presentation of a vigorous defense, because under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, a defendant may seek leave to amend its answers to assert defenses based on
facts that become known during discovery.”).
128. One short article mentions this second level of analysis but summarily dismisses
the declining courts’ fairness concerns in the course of its argument that Twombly’s pleading
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whose affirmative defenses are stricken or left unpled after twenty-one days
can access the discovery required to take advantage of a Rule 15 motion to
amend. This question, which no plausibility court has yet addressed, cannot
be answered without a careful analysis of the interrelated provisions of Rules
12, 15, and 26.129 Courts advocating the extension of Twombly to defense
pleadings cannot evade the plainly inequitable time limit imposed on de-
fendants held to the plausibility standard by appealing to Rule 15 if that
same twenty-one-day time limit forecloses defendants from discovering the
facts necessary to support a motion to amend.
The plausibility courts reason that if a defendant subject to Rule 12’s
twenty-one-day time limit for answers uncovers an affirmative defense after
that time expires, that defendant may still amend its pleading as a “matter of
course within . . . 21 days after serving.”130 But these courts ignore several
key facts about motions to amend. First, since Rule 26(d) institutes a “dis-
covery moratorium” prior to the parties’ participation in a Rule 26(f) con-
ference,131 which itself must take place “at least 21 days before a [Rule 16(b)]
scheduling conference,”132 defendants will ordinarily be unable to access any
discovery whatsoever within Rule 15(a)’s twenty-one-day time limit for
amendment as a matter of course.133 Defendants will therefore be unable to
establish any affirmative defenses requiring discovery within the time period
for amendment as a matter of course, and once that twenty-one-day window
has passed, a court evaluates motions to amend according to a more strin-
gent “good cause standard, not FRCP 15.”134 Plaintiffs can defeat “good
cause” motions to amend by claiming prejudice from the delay caused by
such motions.135 These limitations weaken the plausibility courts’ claim that
standard should be applied to affirmative defenses. See Tom Tinkham & Eric Janus, BNA In-
sights: Plausible Answers and Affirmative Defenses, 79 U.S. L. Wk. 2271 (2011).
129. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense . . . . For good cause, the
court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the
action.”).
130. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). It is debatable whether expanding the time limit imposed
on a defendant from twenty-one days to forty-two days really levels the playing field between
that defendant and a plaintiff who may have spent years investigating the facts relevant to
litigation. See supra Section I.B.2.
131. Fed R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1) (“A party may not seek discovery from any source before
the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f) . . . .”); see also Fuss v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Mont., Inc., No. CV 12-83-M-DLC-JCL, 2012 WL 2370420, at *1 (D. Mont. June 21,
2012) (“Rule 26(d) imposes a moratorium . . . on discovery before the Rule 26(f)
conference.”).
132. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(1).
133. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A).
134. Peterson v. Acumed, LLC, No. CV-10-586-HU, 2010 WL 5158542, at *2 (D. Or.
Dec. 14, 2010); accord Baum v. Faith Techs., Inc., No. 10-CV-0144-CVE-TLW, 2010 WL
2365451, at *4 (N.D. Okla. June 9, 2010) (“Should defendant seek to amend its amended
answer, defendant must establish good cause to do so, and plaintiff will have an opportunity to
object.”).
135. Herrera v. Utilimap Corp., No. H-11-3851, 2012 WL 3527065, at *4 (S.D. Tex.
Aug. 14, 2012) (“In deciding whether the amendment is proper, the court needs to consider:
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since defendants held to a plausibility standard can freely amend their plead-
ings, they are not prejudiced by Rule 12’s short answer deadline.
Second, and even more importantly, the plausibility courts fail to ac-
knowledge that defendants will be unable to amend under either the “matter
of course” or “good cause” standards if, after the Rule 26(d) discovery mora-
torium is lifted, Rule 26(b) then bars them from accessing the discovery
necessary to establish the plausibility of their unpled or stricken affirmative
defenses.136 In the early stages of litigation, prior to discovery, a defendant
often lacks the “factual information that would enable it to satisfy the plead-
ing standards set forth in [Twombly].”137 While Rule 26(b) allows a court to
“order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the
action,”138 at least one district court has found that “an unpleaded affirma-
tive defense is not ‘involved in the action’—instead, it is ‘exclu[ded] from
the case.’ ”139 Even proponents of extending plausibility pleading to affirma-
tive defenses acknowledge that “[i]n a litigation environment hostile to
broad discovery, facts related to an unpleaded affirmative defense” might
not support discovery under Rule 26.140 If discovery remains unavailable—
even after the Rule 26(d) moratorium is lifted—to defendants who were
unable to plead their affirmative defenses within the harsh Rule 12 time
limit, Rule 15’s generous leave-to-amend provision offers them no relief,
defeating the plausibility courts’ answer to the declining courts’ basic fair-
ness concern.141
Proponents of plausibility pleading might respond that defendants’ lack
of discovery “at worst . . . put the fact-deficient defendant in the same
position as the fact-deficient plaintiff.”142 This response fundamentally
‘(1) the explanation for the failure to [timely move for leave to amend]; (2) the importance of
the [amendment]; (3) the potential prejudice in allowing the [amendment]; and (4) the availa-
bility of a continuance to cure such prejudice.’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting S&W En-
ters., L.L.C. v. SouthTrust Bank of Ala., 315 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003))).
136. Fed R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also Petroci v. Transworld Sys., Inc., No. 12-CV-00729
(A)(M), 2012 WL 5464597, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2012) (“[T]his reasoning begs the ques-
tion of whether discovery would even be available concerning an unpleaded affirmative de-
fense, since the ‘[f]ailure to plead an affirmative defense in the answer results in the waiver of
that defense and its exclusion from the case.’ ” (second alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 889 F.2d 1248, 1252 (2d Cir. 1989))), report and
recommendation adopted by No. 12-CV-729A, 2012 WL 5464579 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2012).
137. Hahn v. Best Recovery Servs., No. 10-12370, 2010 WL 4483375, at *2 (E.D. Mich.
Nov. 1, 2010).
138. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
139. Petroci, 2012 WL 5464597, at *3 n.4 (alteration in original) (quoting Cont’l Ill.
Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 889 F.2d at 1253).
140. Tinkham & Janus, supra note 128, at 2274. It should be noted that while Rule
26(b)(1) can, and probably should, be read to allow discovery relating to unpled affirmative
defenses as a “matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense,” that reading is far from
assured. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
141. See supra Section I.B.2.
142. Tinkham & Janus, supra note 128, at 2274.
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misconceives both the respective roles of plaintiffs and defendants in litiga-
tion143 and the disparate burden the plausibility standard imposes on de-
fendants constrained by Rule 12’s answer deadline.144 A plaintiff may
investigate its claim before determining whether the tremendous investment
of time and money inherent in instigating litigation is worthwhile; a defen-
dant, on the other hand, does not choose to come before the court. To task a
defendant with pleading factually specific affirmative defenses within
twenty-one days of service—before it can obtain discovery, no less—im-
poses an asymmetrical and unfairly onerous burden on that defendant. Such
considerations have led courts to hold that the question of “whether there is
a factual bases [sic] for affirmative defenses should be addressed during the
discovery process and not through a motion to strike or a motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings.”145
III. Frequently Overlooked Arguments Reinforcing the
Declining Courts’ Position
While most courts rely on two primary arguments—one textual146 and
one practical147—to support the increasingly widespread position that
Twombly does not apply to affirmative defenses, those arguments are by no
means the only reasons to read Twombly narrowly. This Part advances two
additional arguments in support of the declining courts’ position that have
not been considered in the academic literature on this subject. Section III.A
contends that the canons of statutory construction indicate that courts
should confine Twombly to the complaint, and Section III.B argues that ex-
tending plausibility pleading beyond the complaint violates the principles
outlined in the Rules Enabling Act.148
143. The Court and Congress have both recognized that a defendant is “haled into
court against his will,” Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 366 (1978), and
based on that fact have chosen to apply asymmetrical rules to plaintiffs and defendants in
other areas of civil procedure. See, e.g., id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (2006) (providing greater
supplemental jurisdiction coverage to defendants than plaintiffs based on their differing roles
in litigation). This fact casts doubt on scholars’ assertions that since “the Federal Rules should
not be understood to create systemically different treatment for plaintiffs and defendants,”
plausibility pleading should be applied symmetrically to both parties. Tinkham & Janus, supra
note 128, at 2272. The Court and Congress have no qualms applying asymmetrical standards
in areas of civil procedure where the parties are differently situated, as plaintiffs and defend-
ants are here.
144. See supra Section I.B.2.
145. Hahn v. Best Recovery Servs., No. 10-12370, 2010 WL 4483375, at *2 (E.D. Mich.
Nov. 1, 2010) (declining to extend plausibility pleading to affirmative defenses).
146. See supra Section I.B.1.
147. See supra Section I.B.2.
148. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–77 (2006).
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A. The Canons of Statutory Construction Indicate That Plausibility
Pleading Does Not Apply to Affirmative Defenses
The Court often invokes the canons of statutory construction in inter-
preting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and while lower courts have not
yet broadly applied such analysis in determining the extent of Twombly’s
reach, one canon in particular provides a clear answer to the question of
whether plausibility pleading applies to affirmative defenses. In one of the
heightened pleading cases leading up to Twombly, Leatherman v. Tarrant
County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,149 the Court explicitly in-
voked the expressio unius est exclusio alterius (“the mention of one thing
implies the exclusion of the other”)150 canon in refusing to extend height-
ened pleading under Rule 9151 to any action beyond fraud and mistake. Ad-
ditionally, Justice Stevens explicitly mentioned this canon in a footnote to
his dissenting opinion in Twombly.152
The Court gives “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure their plain mean-
ing . . . as with a statute,”153 and since the Court relied on the expressio unius
est exclusio alterius canon in interpreting Rule 9, it makes sense for district
courts to similarly employ the canon in determining whether Twombly ap-
plies to affirmative defenses. At least one district court has noted that “[t]he
rule of interpretation of expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies with
force” to a determination of the proper affirmative defense pleading stan-
dard.154 Thus, the drafters’ inclusion of unique “showing” language155 in
Rule 8’s section governing complaints should imply the exclusion of that
language from the sections governing defenses. The plausibility courts, in
“artificially supply[ing] Rules 8(b)(1) and 8(c)(1) with the unique language
of Rule 8(a)(2),” disregard this well-accepted principle of construction.156
The growing number of district courts declining to extend plausibility
149. 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (reasoning that since Rule 9(b) only imposes heightened
pleading in averments of fraud and mistake, the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon
indicates that such heightened pleading does not extend to any other pleadings).
150. Hardy v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 164 F.3d 789, 794 (2d Cir. 1999) (relying
“on the familiar principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing
implies the exclusion of the other”).
151. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particu-
larity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”).
152. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 576 n.3 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“We have recognized that the canon of expresio unius est exclusio alterius applies to Rule
9(b).”).
153. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989).
154. See EEOC v. Joe Ryan Enters., Inc., 281 F.R.D. 660, 663 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (“If the
drafters of Rule 8 intended for defendants to plead affirmative defenses with the factual speci-
ficity required of complaints, they would have included the same language requiring a ‘show-
ing’ of ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ in the subsections governing answers and affirmative defenses.”
(alteration in original)).
155. Rule 8’s “showing” language was the primary language the Court interpreted in
Twombly. See supra Section I.B.1.
156. Joe Ryan Enters., 281 F.R.D. at 663.
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pleading to affirmative defenses should follow Justice Stevens’s lead and
anchor their interpretation of Twombly in the expressio unius est exclusio al-
terius principle.
B. Extending Twombly Beyond the Complaint Violates the Principles of the
Rules Enabling Act
By importing Twombly’s plausibility standard into defense pleadings to
remedy the problem of boilerplate affirmative defenses,157 the plausibility
courts essentially rewrite Rule 8(c) to address an issue entirely discrete from
the problem of frivolous claims discussed in Twombly. In so doing, they
violate the principles of the Rules Enabling Act, which delegates the power
to prescribe general rules of procedure to the Supreme Court.158 These
courts attempt to justify their treatment of Rule 8(c) by claiming to further
the policy goals underlying Twombly,159 but few district courts have consid-
ered the extent to which this de facto revision of a Federal Rule disregards
the rules’ revision process established by Congress.
The cases160 and prior scholarly articles161 specifically addressing post-
Twombly affirmative defense pleading have almost uniformly162 entertained
157. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.
158. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006) (“The Supreme Court shall have
the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases
in the United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges thereof)
and courts of appeals.”).
159. See supra Section I.A.3.
160. Aguilar v. City Lights of China Rest., Inc., No. DKC 11-2416, 2011 WL 5118325, at
*3 (D. Md. Oct. 24, 2011) (noting that in extending Twombly, plausibility courts “cite the
importance of litigation efficiency, explaining that boilerplate defenses serve only to ‘clutter
the docket and . . . create unnecessary work’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Bradshaw v.
Hilco Receivables, LLC, 725 F. Supp. 2d 532, 536 (D. Md. 2010))); accord Hansen v. R.I.’s Only
24 Hour Truck & Auto Plaza, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 119, 122–23 (D. Mass. 2012) (“Courts that have
applied the heightened pleading standard to affirmative defenses have often done so on the
basis that Twombly aimed to eliminate the high costs of discovery associated with boilerplate
claims and that boilerplate affirmative defenses have the same detrimental effect on the cost of
litigation.”).
161. See, e.g., Goff & Bales, supra note 19, at 642 (“Applying plausibility standards to all
pleadings will ensure efficiency . . . .”); Bilek, supra note 19, at 404 (“The Twombly Court was
first to pronounce the Court’s concern over discovery costs when it explained that the purpose
of adopting a heightened pleading requirement is to relieve the parties of the high costs of
discovery wasted on claims or defenses which are not actually grounded in a factual basis.”);
Pysno, supra note 19, at 1662 (“The Twombly court explicitly expressed concern about litiga-
tion costs. There is little doubt that reducing expense in discovery is a necessary and prudent
goal of modern litigation practices and standards.”).
162. One article briefly introduced the idea that boilerplate affirmative defenses fail to
implicate Twombly’s policy concerns. See Durney & Michaud, supra note 19, at 449. This arti-
cle, like all the others previously written on this subject, immediately falls into the trap of
responding to the plausibility courts’ efficiency argument on its own terms, asserting that the
application of plausibility pleading to defenses will not fulfill Twombly’s supposed goal of
decreasing litigation costs. Id. (“Other courts have stated that applying the heightened pleading
standard to affirmative defenses almost certainly guarantees the waste that Twombly and Iqbal
sought to eradicate.”).
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the premise that the Court heightened pleading standards to generally im-
prove litigation efficiency,163 and that therefore weeding out boilerplate af-
firmative defenses serves the Court’s underlying goal. In actual fact, the
Court “has never once lost sleep worrying about defendants filing nuisance
affirmative defenses.”164 Twombly focused exclusively on protecting defend-
ants—not on increasing general litigation efficiency—and explicitly voiced
concerns about plaintiffs subjecting defendants to frivolous lawsuits, expen-
sive discovery, and in terrorem settlements.165 The problem of boilerplate
affirmative defenses cluttering district court dockets therefore implicates a
set of issues and policy concerns entirely discrete from the concerns underly-
ing Twombly.166
Without the cover afforded by an expansive misinterpretation of the
policy goals underlying Twombly, it becomes apparent that the plausibility
courts have taken the Court’s reinterpretation of Rule 8(a) as an invitation
to reinterpret Rule 8(c) in a way that reduces strain on their dockets.167 Dis-
trict courts should recognize this de facto rewriting of Rule 8(c) as a viola-
tion of the Rules Enabling Act, and they should bear in mind that “policy
considerations,” such as a desire to reduce the number of boilerplate affirm-
ative defense pleadings, “are foreclosed when the language of the Rule is
clear,” since “[t]he judiciary is commissioned to interpret the Rules as they
are written, not to re-draft them when it may be convenient.”168
Given that Twombly’s reinterpretation of Rule 8(a) focused on “show-
ing” language not found in Rule 8(c), the application of plausibility pleading
to complaints and affirmative defenses alike, “despite this clear distinction in
the rules’ language, would run counter to the Supreme Court’s warning in
Twombly that legislative action, not ‘judicial interpretation,’ is necessary to
163. See supra Section I.A.3.
164. Hansen, 287 F.R.D. at 123 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Leon v.
Jacobson Transp. Co., No. 10 C 4939, 2010 WL 4810600 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2010)).
165. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557–58 (2007).
166. In arguing that plausibility pleading will increase motion practice and fail to
achieve the Court’s goal of “litigation efficiency,” opponents of extending the plausibility stan-
dard to affirmative defenses are missing the point. They should instead take advantage of the
opportunity to directly attack the plausibility courts’ misinterpretation of Twombly and refocus
attention on its actual, defendant-focused goals. See Hansen, 287 F.R.D. at 123 (“However, the
concerns voiced in Iqbal that high discovery costs will induce undeserved settlements do not
apply in the context of affirmative defenses.”).
167. Some jurists have argued that Twombly and Iqbal themselves conflict with the
Rules Enabling Act, see, e.g., McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 624 (7th Cir. 2011)
(Hamilton, J., dissenting) (construed in Cooper, supra note 14, at 967 n.34), but their deci-
sions at least drew support from Rule 8(a)’s “showing” language, which arguably lends itself to
a heightened pleading standard. District courts expanding Twombly’s holding to Rule 8(c)
cannot similarly draw support from the Rules’ text. See Lopez v. Asmar’s Mediterranean Food,
Inc., No. 1:10cv1218 (JCC), 2011 WL 98573, at *2 (E.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2011) (stating that the
court is “bound to apply the relevant rules of civil procedure as written” and finding that the
lack of any “showing” language in Rules 8(b)(1)(A) or 8(c)(1) meant that Twombly/Iqbal’s
plausibility pleading standard did not apply).
168. EEOC v. Joe Ryan Enters., Inc., 281 F.R.D. 660, 663 (M.D. Ala. 2012).
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‘broaden the scope’ of specific federal pleading standards.”169 District courts
that decline to extend Twombly to affirmative defenses have the opportunity
not only to refute the plausibility courts’ faulty appeal to the policies under-
lying Twombly, but also to anchor their arguments in the rules’ revision
procedures prescribed by the Court and the Rules Enabling Act.
Conclusion
Due to misguided reliance on traditional pleading practices, an impre-
cise reading of Twombly, and an overestimation of the availability of discov-
ery for unpled or stricken affirmative defenses, the courts that currently
extend plausibility pleading to affirmative defenses fail to perceive that such
an extension imposes an unfairly onerous burden on defendants. These
courts essentially rewrite Rule 8(c) to ease strain on their dockets, and in so
doing, they violate both the canons of statutory construction and the princi-
ples of the Rules Enabling Act.
169. Kohler v. Islands Rests., LP, 280 F.R.D. 560, 566 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569 n.14).
